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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This case concerns the application of sub-paragraph (a) of 
Article 5 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“Convention”). Specifically, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“Court”) is asked to consider whether Mr. H.W.’s (“the applicant”) 
preventive detention violated his right to liberty under Article 5 § 1 




 The applicant was born in 1959 and is currently being 
detained in Berlin-Tegel Prison. In 1995, the Braunschweig District 
Court convicted the applicant of attempted coercion and attempted 
extortion of a fourteen-year-old girl and three counts of sexual abuse 
of children by exhibitionist acts. The District Court sentenced him to 
one year and three months imprisonment and granted him probation. 
On November 26, 1997, the Berlin Regional Court convicted the 
applicant on several grounds, including rape, sexual coercion, and 
sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl and of two ten-year-old girls in 
their apartments. For these offenses, the Regional Court sentenced 
him to nine years and six months imprisonment with preventive 
detention. 
 After consultation with a neurologic and psychiatric expert, 
the Regional Court found that the applicant, who had confessed to 
the offenses, had acted with full criminal responsibility,  but suffered 
from a dissocial and narcissistic personality disorder and a sexual 
deviation that required therapeutic treatment. The report indicated 
that he had a propensity to commit serious offenses, in particular 
sexual offenses, and was therefore dangerous to the public.  
 On November 1, 2007, the Berlin Regional Court ordered the 
execution of the preventive detention order against the applicant. 
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Relying on the psychiatric report from May 29, 1997, the court held 
that the applicant was still dangerous to the public. Moreover, the 
court held that the conclusions in the report were still valid because 
the applicant’s personality and attitude exhibited no significant 
changes. Also, while in prison, he had refused to attend therapy to 
address his offenses. 
 On December 24, 2007, the applicant served his full sentence, 
but since then he has been held in preventive detention in the Berlin-
Tegel Prison.  
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 On September 29, 2009, the applicant asked the Berlin Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and the Berlin Regional Court to inform him of 
the progress of his proceedings pursuant to Article 67e of the 
Criminal Code. In this written request, he asked for review of 
whether the further execution of the preventive detention order 
against him was necessary. In his letter, he requested to have a 
lawyer appointed to him and to consult an expert on his 
dangerousness. 
 On November 9, 2009, the Berlin Regional Court asked the 
Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office to obtain the information necessary 
to conduct proper review proceedings. On November 11, 2009, the 
Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office asked the Berlin-Tegel Prison 
authority to make a statement on the applicant’s situation and 
development in preventive detention. The request, however, was 
never received. On December 2, 2009, the Public Prosecutor made a 
second request for a statement, which was eventually received on 
December 17, 2009. 
 On December 28, 2009, the Berlin-Tegel Prison authority 
submitted its statement to the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office. The 
statement recommended against suspending the execution of the 
applicant’s preventive detention, citing to the applicant’s refusal to 
attended therapy. 
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 On January 20, 2010, the Berlin Regional Court, after hearing 
the applicant and his counsel, ordered the applicant’s preventive 
detention to continue, dismissing his request to interrupt the 
execution of that detention. Relying upon the applicant’s conduct in 
prison and his written and oral statements, the Regional Court 
concluded that he would likely reoffend if released. Moreover, 
because of these facts, the Regional Court found it unnecessary to 
consult a psychiatric expert on the applicant’s dangerousness.  
 On February 1, 2010, the applicant lodged an appeal against 
the Regional Court’s decision. He argued that the Regional Court 
failed to draw any consequences from the delays caused by the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, which extended the time limit for the 
review of his preventive detention.  On June 17, 2010, the Berlin 
Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, affirming the 
Regional Court’s finding that the applicant would likely commit 
more unlawful acts upon his release.  
 The applicant, who was no longer represented by counsel, 
subsequently filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal 
Constitutional Court. He argued in particular, that his constitutional 
right to liberty had been violated. Specifically, since December 24, 
2009, there was no longer a legal basis for his preventive detention. 
He further complained that the proceedings before the courts dealing 
with the execution of his sentences had been unfair as the courts had 
never sufficiently established the facts on which they had based their 
conclusion that he was still dangerous to the public. In particular, he 
argued that the 1997 expert report was out of date and thus 
unreliable. Instead, a more recent expert report on his dangerousness 
should have been obtained.  
 On September 16, 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court, 
without explanation, declined to consider the applicant’s 
constitutional complaint.  
 
C. Domestic Law 
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 Under Article 66 of the Criminal Code, a sentencing court 
may, at the time of an offender’s conviction, order his preventive 
detention, known as a measure of correction and prevention, under 
certain circumstances, if the offender has been shown to be 
dangerous to the public.  
 Article 67d of the Criminal Code governs the duration of 
preventive detention. Paragraph 2, first sentence, of that Article, in 
its version in force at the relevant time, provides that if a maximum 
duration is not established or if the time limit has not yet expired, the 
court shall suspend on probation the further execution of the 
detention order as soon as the offender is considered rehabilitated 
and unlikely to commit any other unlawful acts on his or her release. 
 Under Article 67e of the Criminal Code, the court may 
review at any time whether further execution of the preventive 
detention order should be suspended and a measure of probation 
applied or whether preventive detention should be terminated. The 
court is obligated to do so within fixed time limits. For persons in 
preventive detention, this time limit is two years.  
 Article 458 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
that if objections are raised to the lawfulness of the execution of a 
penalty, a court decision shall be obtained. The further execution of 
the penalty shall not be suspended; the court may, however, order a 
suspension of execution. Pursuant to Article 463 § 1 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, Article 458 applies, mutatis mutandis, to the 
execution of measure of correction and prevention. 
 Under Article 463 § 3, third sentence, read in conjunction 
with Article 454 § 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the courts 
dealing with the execution of sentences have to consult an expert on 
the convicted person’s dangerousness in proceedings under Article 
67d 2 of the Criminal Code.  
 
D. European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, 
reads as follows: 
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1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after 
conviction by a competent court; 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 The Court’s discussion is broken down into two sections. The 
first section concerns whether the Regional Court’s failure to comply 
with the two-year time limit laid down in Article 67e of the Criminal 
Code had breached the applicant’s right to liberty under Article 5 § 1 
of the Convention. The second section addresses the Court’s analysis 
of whether it was unlawful to continue the applicant’s preventive 
detention without ordering a new psychiatric expert report that 
evaluated his dangerousness to the public.  
 
A. Court’s Assessment of the Alleged Violation of Article 5 § 1 of the 
Convention on Account of Non-Compliance with the Time Limit for 
Judicial Review  
 
 Beginning with the first issue, the Court remarked, 
“[c]ompliance with the rules of national law primarily requires any 
arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law but also 
relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the 
rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention.” 
The Court interpreted “quality of the law” to mean that where a 
national law authorizes deprivation of liberty, it must be “sufficiently 
accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, in order to 
avoid all risk of arbitrariness.” Therefore, under the Convention, 
compliance with national law is not sufficient. Rather, Article 5 § 1 
of the Convention requires that any deprivation of liberty should be 
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in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from 
arbitrariness.  
 One of the factors the Court considers when assessing 
whether a person’s detention is arbitrary for purposes of Article 5 § 1 
is “the speed with which the domestic courts replaced a detention 
order which had either expired or had been found to be defective.” In 
this respect, the Court referenced two cases where review of the 
applicants’ detention order had been delayed for eighty-two days and 
nine and a half months, respectively. In both cases, the judges ruled 
that the applicants’ liberty rights had been violated. In contrast, other 
case rulings stated that a delay in the replacement of a detention 
order lasting two weeks in one case and one month in another did not 
violate the applicants’ liberty interest under Article 5 § 1 of the 
Convention.  
 In such preventive detention cases, the court has also 
previously examined the following factors when assessing whether a 
person’s detention must be considered arbitrary for the purposes of 
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention: (1) whether adequate safeguards 
existed to ensure the applicant’s release from detention would not be 
unreasonable delayed; (2) whether the applicant contributed in any 
way to the delays caused in the procedure; (3) whether the applicant 
objected to a foreseeable delay in the proceedings; and (4) whether 
the delay could be attributed to the complexity of the proceedings.  
 Before applying the factors to the case at hand, the Court 
briefly analyzed the domestic court’s holding and concluded that 
under domestic law, the applicant’s preventive detention following 
December 24, 2009 was lawful. However, the Court quickly pointed 
out that “national law must also be of a certain quality: it must 
contain clear and accessible rules governing the circumstances in 
which deprivation of liberty is permissible.” Thus, 
“despite…compliance with domestic law,” a person’s detention may 
still be arbitrary and thus contrary to Article 5 §1 of the Convention, 
if the relevant factors weigh in favor of the applicant.  
 As such, the Court first examined the speed with which the 
domestic courts replaced the expired detention order. The Court 
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found that the delay of 27 days was not a negligible period of time. 
Moreover, “a delay of almost one month is at the upper limit of what 
it could still consider as reasonable, depending on all the 
circumstances.”  
Next, the Court concluded that the applicant cannot be said to 
have contributed to delays in the review procedure. As evidence of 
this, the Court noted the applicant’s ongoing inquiries about the 
progress of his review proceedings prior to the expiration of the two-
year limit. On the contrary, the Court found that the delays “in the 
review proceedings were mainly caused by the fact that the Berlin 
Regional Court…initiated the review proceedings belatedly, only 
some six weeks before the expiry of the statutory time-limit for 
review.” Thereafter, “delays caused, in particular, by the fact that the 
letter to the Berlin-Tegel Prison authority was lost, could no longer 
be made up.” For these reasons, the Court ruled that the delays in the 
procedure were not “caused by an unforeseeable complexity of the 
proceedings,” but rather by mistakes made by the Public Prosecutor’s 
office.  
 Finally, the Court found that there were no “sufficiently clear 
safeguards to ensure that a decision on the applicant’s release from 
detention would not be unreasonably delayed.” In this respect, the 
Court emphasized the applicant’s lack of contribution to the delays. 
Moreover, “the threshold applied by the domestic courts, which 
examined whether the procedure followed in the review proceedings 
disclosed a ‘flagrant irregularity,’ was too high and thus failed to 
afford the applicant sufficient protection from excessive delays.” As 
a final remark, the Court noted “the lack of adequate safeguards was 
once again demonstrated by the fact that the time limit under Article 
67e…was once again exceeded – by some two months – in the fresh 
review proceedings following those at issue in the present case.” 
 Thus, the Court concluded that the applicant’s detention 
between December 24, 2009 and January 20, 2010 was arbitrary and 
thus unlawful for the purposes of Article 5 §1 of the Convention.  
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B. Court’s Assessment of Alleged Violation of Article 5 §1 of the 
Convention of the Convention for Failure to Obtain a Recent 
Medical Expert Report 
 
The Court also considered whether it was unlawful to 
continue the applicant’s preventive detention without ordering a new 
psychiatric expert report evaluating his dangerousness to the public.  
 The Court began by pointing out that “the word ‘after’ in sub-
paragraph (a) does not simply mean that the ‘detention’ must follow 
the ‘conviction’ in point of time.” Rather, “[t]here must be a 
sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the 
deprivation of liberty at issue.” This causal link may be broken if the 
reasons for the applicant’s current detention are incompatible with 
the grounds for his initial detention.  
 Thus, at issue here is how the reviewing court came to the 
conclusion that the applicant was still dangerous to the public. It is 
the applicant’s contention that the reviewing court made its decision 
“without any recent expert report and on the basis of insufficient 
reasons.” In this respect, the Court agreed with the applicant.  The 
Court considered “the only psychiatric expert report available to the 
domestic courts examining whether the applicant was dangerous to 
the public… was more than twelve and a half years old.” The Court 
further stated that “[i]n such circumstances, a sufficient 
establishment of the relevant facts concerning a person’s current 
dangerousness, which resulted from personality disorders and a 
sexual deviation and thus from a condition the persistence of which 
is difficult to evaluate by persons without medical expertise, will, as 
a rule, necessitate obtaining recent expert advice.” 
 Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the failure of 
the domestic courts to at least attempt to obtain “fresh advice from an 
external medical expert on the necessity of the applicant’s continuing 
preventive detention” violated the applicant’s liberty rights under 
Article 5 §1 of the Convention.  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
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The applicant alleged, “in particular, that the domestic courts’ 
failure to comply with the statutory time limit for review of the 
necessity of his preventive detention and their refusal to consult a 
medical expert on his dangerousness violated Article 5 §1 of the 
Convention.”1 The following analysis will take a closer look at the 
case law relied upon by the Court to support its holdings. It is my 
contention that the Court misapplied the case law as to the first 
holding, but properly applied it as to the second holding.  
 
A. Revisiting Erkalo, Schönbrod, Rutten, and Winterwerp 
 
 Beginning with the first issue, the Court listed five factors 
relevant in assessing whether a person’s detention must be 
considered arbitrary for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the 
Convention:2 (1) the speed with which the domestic courts replaced a 
detention order which had either expired or had been found 
defective;3 (2) whether adequate safeguards existed to ensure that the 
applicant’s release from detention would not be unreasonably 
delayed;4 (3) whether the applicant contributed in any way to the 
delays caused in the procedure;5 (4) whether the applicant objected to 
a foreseeable delay in the proceedings;6 and (5) whether the delay 
could be attributed to the complexity of the proceedings.7  
 Although no single factor is dispositive on the question of 
whether a person’s detention must be considered arbitrary for 
purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court in the present 
                                                
1 H.W. v. Germany, App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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case, as well as in prior cases, gave more weight to the first two 
factors.8 For this reason, this analysis, too, will emphasize the first 
two factors, namely: (1) the speed with which the domestic courts 
replaced a detention order which had either expired or had been 
found defective; 9  and (2) whether there had been adequate 
safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release from detention 
would not be unreasonably delayed.10  
 
B.  Erkalo v. The Netherlands 
 
 In Erkalo v. The Netherlands, review of the applicant’s 
detention was delayed by eighty-two days.11 The applicant in Erkalo 
had been convicted on two counts of manslaughter.12 The court 
sentenced him to five years imprisonment and placed him in a 
psychiatric institution for a two-year period commencing on July 3, 
1991.13 On May 17, 1993, the public prosecutor prepared a request 
for a one-year extension of the applicant’s placement. 14  The 
applicant was also informed of this request. 15  However, the 
prosecutor’s request did not arrive to the registry of the Regional 
Court; instead, it was accidentally placed in the court’s archives.16 
                                                
8 See Erkalo v. The Netherlands, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1998), http://www.echr.coe.int; Schönbrod v. Germany, 
App. No. 48038/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://www.echr.coe.int; 
Rutten v. The Netherlands, App. No. 32605/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001), 
http://www.echr.coe.int; Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, App. No. 
6301/73 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1979), http://www.echr.coe.int. 
9 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 68. 
10 Id. ¶ 73.  
11 Erkalo, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085, ¶57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1998). 
12 Id. ¶ 9. 
13 Id. ¶ 10. 
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 Because of the filing error, the Regional Court did not receive 
the public prosecutor’s request for the extension of the placement 
order “until two months after the expiration of the statutory period, 
and, as a result, for eighty-two days, the placement of the applicant 
was not based on any judicial decision.”17 
 The Court also observed that that there was a lack of 
adequate safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release from 
detention would not be unreasonably delayed.18 This was evidenced 
by the fact that it was the “applicant’s own initiative that set in 
motion the judicial proceedings.”19  
 For these reasons the Court concluded that the “detention of 
the applicant between the date of the expiry of the initial placement 
order and the date on which the Regional Court rendered its 
decision,” was not compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1 of 
the Convention, and thus it was unlawful.20 
 The Erkalo case shares some important similarities with the 
present case. For instance, like the applicant in Erkalo, the applicant 
in the present case also took the initiative by asking  authorities about 
the progress of the review proceedings for his preventive detention.21 
Thus, the applicant had nothing to do with the delay of his case 
review.22 This suggests that the second factor, namely, whether there 
had been adequate safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release 
from detention would not be unreasonable delayed, should be 
weighed in the applicant’s favor. Indeed, it was not the applicant’s 
fault, but rather, the public prosecutor’s error that caused the delay of 
the review proceedings.23 
                                                
17 Id. ¶ 57.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. ¶ 60.  
21 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 85.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. ¶ 87.  
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 However, unlike the applicant in Erkalo the applicant here 
was only placed in detention for an additional 27 days.24 In contrast, 
the applicant in Erkalo was placed in detention for an additional 82 
days.25 That is over three times the length that the applicant in the 
present case was detained. Thus, even if, for arguments sake, 
adequate safeguards were not in place to ensure that the applicant’s 
release from detention would not be unreasonably delayed, the length 
of the applicant’s stay in this case was much shorter than the 
applicant in Erkalo.  
 
C. Schönbrod v. Germany 
 
Similarly, the applicant in Schönbrod v. Germany had his 
review proceedings delayed by about nine and a half months.26 The 
applicant in Schönbrod had a long history of convictions ranging 
from theft to aggravated armed robbery.27 On May 20, 1996, three 
years after being released from jail, the applicant was arrested again 
and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.28 The applicant was set to 
complete his preventive detention on June 7, 2005, but his detention 
was not reviewed until March 30, 2006 – a delay of nine and a half 
months.29 
The Court observed that a delay of nine and a half months 
was a “considerable time” for the applicant to be in detention without 
the necessary court order.30 The Court also noted that “nothing 
indicate[d] that the applicant contributed in any way to the delays 
caused in the procedure.”31 Quite the contrary, the Court found that 
                                                
24 Id. ¶ 27. 
25 Erkalo, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085, ¶57 9Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011). 
26 Schönbrod, App. No. 48038/06, ¶ 103.  
27 Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 
28 Id. ¶ 16. 
29 Id. ¶¶ 25-26. 
30 Id. ¶ 78.  
31 Id. ¶ 107.  
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while the Regional Court had already initiated the proceedings at 
issue nine months before the end of the applicant’s prison sentence, 
the proceedings were subsequently delayed for several reasons.32 
One of these reasons was that the public prosecutor’s office took six 
months to send the case file to the Regional Court.33 For these 
reasons, the Court held that the applicant’s detention was arbitrary 
and thus unlawful for purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.34 
 Like Erkalo, Schönbrod also has many similarities with the 
present case. For instance, like the applicant in Schönbrod, the 
applicant in this case had nothing to do with the delays caused in the 
review proceedings.35 Moreover, like both Erkalo and Schönbrod, 
the public prosecutor’s mistakes caused the delay in the applicant’s 
detention review. 36  However, there is a staggering difference 
between the present case and Schönbrod in that the applicant in 
Schönbrod had his review proceedings delayed by nine and a half 
months compared to only twenty-seven days in the present case.37  
 
C. Rutten v. The Netherlands 
 
 In contrast, the applicant in Rutten v. The Netherlands had 
only experienced a delay of about one month in his review 
proceedings. 38  In Rutten, the applicant had been convicted of 
attempted homicide and sentenced to eight months imprisonment.39 
In addition, “the Court of Appeal imposed a TBS order (similar to 
                                                
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 85. 
36 Id. ¶ 87. 
37 Id. ¶ 27. 
38 Rutten v. Netherlands, App. No. 32605/96, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2001).  
39 Id. ¶ 9. 
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preventive detention) with confinement to a secure institution.”40 The 
“TBS order took effect on September 4, 1992 and expired two years 
later on September 4, 1994.”41 On September 9, 1994, “the Regional 
Court prolonged the TBS order by one year, now set to expire on 
September 4, 1995.”42 On July 18, 1995, “the public prosecutor 
requested that the TBS be further prolonged based on the advice of 
the secure institution where the applicant was being held.”43 
 The Regional Court examined the prosecutor’s request in a 
hearing held on September 22, 1995.44 The applicant “argued that the 
prolongation should be inadmissible because the TBS order had 
expired on September 4, 1995.”45 On October 6, 1995, the Regional 
Court rejected the applicant’s argument and prolonged his TBS order 
for an additional year.46 
 In its analysis, the Court observed that the “prosecutor’s 
request was filed within the statutory time limit and the applicant 
was informed on July 28, 1995 that the Regional Court would 
consider the request for a prolongation of the order at the hearing on 
September 22, 1995.”47 However, it was only at the actual hearing on 
September 22, 1995 that the applicant expressed objections against 
the delay in the examination of the review proceedings.48 Based on 
these facts, the Court held that the “applicant’s detention between the 
expiry of his TBS order and the determination of the Regional Court 
of the request for the prolongation” could not be regarded as 
involving an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.49 
                                                
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. ¶ 10. 
43 Id. ¶ 11. 
44 Id. ¶ 12.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. ¶ 13.  
47 Id. ¶45. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. ¶ 46.  
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 In the present case, the Court distinguished Rutten. 50  It 
pointed out that “unlike the applicant in the present case, the 
applicant in the case of Rutten could be considered to have accepted 
the foreseeable delay in the examination of his case by domestic 
courts” because he never objected to it.51  Although this is in fact 
true, it only supports a finding that one of the factors, namely, 
whether the applicant objected to a foreseeable delay in the 
proceedings, should be weighed in the applicant’s favor. Moreover, 
although the Court stated that the present case can be distinguished 
from Rutten in “several respects,” the Court only listed the one 
mentioned above.52 Thus, although the applicant in the present case 
was never given prior notice of a delay in his review proceedings, 
that factor still does not outweigh the short length that his review 
proceedings were delayed, i.e., 27 days.   
 
D. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands 
 
Lastly, in Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, the applicant had 
only experienced a delay of about two weeks before his detention 
was reviewed.53 On December 16, 1969, “the Regional Court made 
an order authorizing the prolongation of the detention of the 
applicant by one year.” 54  On December 14, 1970, “the public 
prosecutor at ‘s-Hertogenbosch requested the renewal of the 
detention order for a further year, on the basis of the monthly records 
of the doctors who had successively treated Mr. Winterwerp.”55  On 
January 7, 1971, two weeks after the previous order expired, the 
Regional Court authorized further detention for another year.56 
                                                
50 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 84. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Winterwerp, App. No. 6301/73, ¶ 49.  
54 Id. ¶ 26. 
55 Id. ¶ 27.  
56 Id. 
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The applicant argued that “his confinement became unlawful 
insofar as it continued beyond the term fixed.”57 The government 
responded that under the Mentally Ill Persons Act, the important date 
is not when the Regional Court gave its ruling, but when the public 
prosecutor filed his request.58 Thus, because the public prosecutor 
had filed his request within the permitted period required by 
domestic law, his conduct was not unreasonable or unlawful.59 The 
Court agreed with the government. 60  The Court held that the 
“interval of two weeks between the expiry of the earlier order and the 
making of the succeeding renewal order can in no way be regarded 
as unreasonable or excessive.”61 
Just like in Winterwerp, the present case complied with 
domestic law.62 In the present case, the threshold applied by the 
domestic courts, which examined whether the procedure followed in 
the proceedings disclosed a “flagrant irregularity,”63 was proper and 
consistent with case law.64 Indeed, the Court admits “the applicant’s 
preventive detention after [December 24 2009] remained lawful 
under domestic law.” 65  Moreover, this finding shows that the 
domestic courts did have adequate safeguards in place to ensure that 
applicant’s release from detention would not be unreasonably 
delayed. Indeed, under domestic law, the applicant would have been 
deprived of his liberty if the procedure followed had “unjustifiable 
disrespected Article 67e of the Criminal Code.”66 Of course, since 
the delay in this present case was caused by an accident and not 
                                                





62 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 90. 
63 Id. ¶ 89.  
64 Id. ¶ 90. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added).  
 
17 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
some “flagrant irregularity,” the applicant’s liberty interests were not 
violated.67 
 After a closer analysis of the four cases cited by the Court in 
support of its first holding, I disagree with its conclusion.  
 First, the Court did not give enough weight to the first factor, 
namely, the speed with which the domestic courts replaced a 
detention order that had either expired or had been found defective. 
As evidenced in Erkalo and Schönbrod, a delay in the review 
proceedings of a person’s preventive detention, for purposes of 
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, should be considered arbitrary if the 
delay is at least eighty-two days68 and certainly if the delay is over 
nine months.69 However, in this case, the applicant’s delay was for 
only twenty-seven days.70 Thus, this case is closer to the facts in 
Winterwerp and Rutten, where the Court held that delays of one 
month71 and two weeks,72 respectively, were not long enough to be 
deemed arbitrary and thus unlawful for purposes of Article 5 § 1 of 
the Convention. 
 Secdon, the Court did not give sufficient deference to the 
domestic courts holding that the Regional Court had not unjustifiably 
disrespected the said provision of the Criminal Code, which 
safeguarded the constitutional right to liberty.73 Put another way, 
“[t]he procedure followed did not disclose a flagrant irregularity.”74 
Instead, the Court insisted that there were no “sufficiently clear 
safeguards to ensure that a decision on the applicant’s release from 
detention would not be unreasonably delayed.”75 However, this is not 
                                                
67 Id. ¶ 31.  
68 Erkalo, App. No. 89/1997/873/1085, ¶57. 
69 Schönbrod, App. No. 48038/06, ¶ 103. 
70 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 27. 
71 Rutten, App. No. 32605/96, ¶ 54. 
72 Winterwerp, App. No. 6301/73, ¶ 49. 
73 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 32. 
74 Id. ¶ 31. 
75 Id. ¶ 89.  
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true. The domestic courts could not be any clearer in providing a 
safeguard to the constitutional right to liberty: there must be a 
flagrant irregularity in the procedure to find a violation of a right to 
liberty.76 
  Nevertheless, the Court stated that the “flagrant irregularity” 
threshold used by the domestic courts “was too high and thus failed 
to afford the applicant sufficient protection from excessive delays.”77 
What the Court essentially asserted, therefore, is that any mistake or 
accident that delays an applicant’s detention review (all other factors 
being considered) by at least one month is unlawful. This to me is 
too extreme of a conclusion. No constitutional right to liberty has 
been violated where the duration of the delay in reviewing the 
person’s detention is minimal and there is, in fact, already adequate 
safeguards to ensure that the applicant’s release from detention 
would not be unreasonably delayed. For these reasons, I would reach 
the opposite conclusion and hold that the delay in the review of the 
applicant’s detention did not violate Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 
 
E. Revisiting Dörr v. Germany 
 
 As to the second issue, the Court held that “by failing to – at 
least attempt to – obtain fresh advice from an external medical expert 
on the necessity of the applicant’s continuing preventive detention,” 
there has been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention.78 I agree 
with this conclusion although an analysis of Dörr v. Germany, App. 
No. 2894/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) demonstrates this to be a close 
decision.  
 In Dörr, the applicant was convicted of two counts of rape 
and one count of attempted rape and bodily assault.79  The court 
                                                
76 Id. ¶ 31.  
77 Id. ¶ 89. 
78 Id. ¶¶ 113-14. 
79 Dörr v. Germany, App. No. 2894/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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sentenced him to ten years imprisonment and ordered his preventive 
detention.80 On January 19, 1999, the applicant completed his prison 
sentence.81 However, because he was still deemed a threat to the 
public, he remained in preventive detention.82   
 One of the applicant’s arguments was that the preventive 
detention “had been based on old and insufficient expert opinion and 
an insufficient establishment of the facts concerning his 
dangerousness, which made the proceedings against him unfair.”83  
 Specifically, although the applicant’s detention was reviewed 
in 2007, the review relied on an analysis made by an external 
psychiatric expert in 2001.84 Moreover, other expert reports from 
1999 and 2001 referenced the applicant’s personality.85 Thus, a six to 
eight year gap existed between the psychiatric experts’ reports and 
the applicant’s detention review.86  
 However, the Court in Dörr pointed out that what was relied 
upon in the reports “was the fact that the applicant’s dangerousness 
resulted from the fact that he had refused all offers of therapy made 
to him throughout the execution of his penalty and had not yet 
reflected on his offenses.”87 Moreover, the “applicant had failed to 
substantiate that there had been any substantial changes to his 
personality or attitude towards his offenses since his last examination 
by an expert.”88 For these and other similar reasons, the Court 
concluded that its “decision not to release the applicant had not been 
based on an assessment of his dangerousness that was unreasonable 








87 Id. (emphasis added). 
88 Id. 
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in terms of the objectives of the judgment of the sentencing court to 
protect the public from significant sexual offenses.”89  
 Like the applicant in Dörr, the applicant in the present case 
was a sexual offender that was placed in preventive detention 
because he posed a threat to the public.90 In addition, like the 
applicant in Dörr, the applicant here also “had not reflected on his 
offenses and had not made any therapy.”91 However, unlike the 
applicant in Dörr, the facts in the present case indicate that the 
applicant was “not entirely unwilling to undergo therapy.”92 The 
applicant in the present case explained that he would “be willing to 
work with a therapist he could trust.”93 
 In addition, the length of time between the applicant’s 
psychiatric expert report and the review of his detention was twelve 
and a half years.94 Indeed, this is significantly longer than the six or 
eight-year gap in Dörr.95 The Court, thus, appropriately puts a lot of 
emphasis on the twelve-and-a-half-year gap.96  
 Although this is a close decision, the Court’s holding was 
proper. Despite its similarities with Dörr, including the applicant’s 
failure to reflect on his offenses or go to therapy,97 the differences in 
this case are significant. Most notably, the applicant in the present 
case had not received a psychiatric evaluation in twelve and a half 
years.98 Moreover, the facts indicate that unlike Dörr, the applicant 
here was “not entirely unwilling to undergo therapy.”99 For these 
                                                
89 Id. 
90 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 8. 
91 Id. ¶ 19. 
92 Id. ¶ 110.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. ¶ 111. 
95 Dörr, App. No. 2894/08.  
96 H.W., App. No. 17167/11, ¶ 111. 
97 Id. ¶ 19. 
98 Id. ¶ 111. 
99 Id. ¶ 110.  
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reasons, failure to obtain a new psychiatric report violated the 




The Court held that the applicant’s rights had been violated 
pursuant to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention because: (1) the domestic 
courts failure to comply with the statutory time limit for review of 
the necessity of the applicant’s preventive detention; and (2) the 
domestic courts’ refusal to consult a medical expert on the 
applicant’s dangerousness to the public.  
